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Abstract 
In recent years, it has been debated whether a reduction in working hours would be a viable solution 
to tackle the unemployment caused by technological change. The improvement of existing production 
technology is gradually being seen to reduce labor demand. Although this debate has been at the 
forefront for many decades, the high and persistent unemployment encountered in the European Union 
has renewed interest in implementing this policy in order to increase employment. According to 
advocates of reducing working hours, this policy will increase the number of workers needed during 
the production process, increasing employment. However, the contradiction expressed by advocates 
of working time reduction is that the increase in labor costs will lead to a reduction in business activity 
and ultimately to a reduction in demand for human resources. In this article, we will attempt to answer 
the question of whether reducing working hours is a way of countering the potential decline in 
employment due to technological change. In order to answer this question, the aforementioned 
conflicting views will be examined. As we will see during our statistical examination of the existing 
empirical studies, the reduction of working time doesn’t lead to increased employment and cannot be 
seen as a solution to the long-lasting unemployment.   
Keywords: Unemployment; Working time reduction; Technological change. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
In recent years, it has been debated whether a reduction in working hours would be a 
viable solution to tackle the unemployment caused by technological change. The 
improvement of existing production technology is gradually being seen to reduce 
labor demand. Although this debate has been at the forefront for many decades, the 
high and persistent unemployment encountered in the European Union has renewed 
interest in implementing this policy in order to increase employment. According to 
advocates of reducing working hours, this policy will increase the number of workers 
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needed during the production process, increasing employment. However, the 
contradiction expressed by advocates of working time reduction is that the increase 
in labor costs will lead to a reduction in business activity and ultimately to a reduction 
in demand for human resources. In this article, we will attempt to answer the question 
of whether reducing working hours is a way of countering the potential decline in 
employment due to technological change. In order to answer this question, the 
aforementioned conflicting views will be examined. Furthermore, we will statistically 
examine numerous empirical studies in order to make some conclusions regarding 
the impact of working time reduction to the employment levels.  
ADDRESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE REDUCTION OF 
WORKING TIME IN EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY 
In this section, three economic models will be examined: the competitive market 
model, the monopsony model, and the collective bargaining model. The competitive 
market model is a useful starting point in looking at the impact of reducing working 
hours. As we will see, compulsory reductions in working time do not improve social 
welfare or increase employment. Consequently, the implementation of the measure 
under consideration is not a way of countering the potential contraction of 
employment due to technological change. However, since there is rarely a perfectly 
competitive market, in reality, other alternative models are then considered to form a 
more complete view of the issue. In conclusion, we could observe that although the 
reduction of working hours cannot be considered as a panacea since in most cases it 
has a negative impact on the economy, nevertheless under very specific conditions 
under consideration it could raise the level of employment. 
Competitive market theory 
Correlation between working time and level of employment 
The main argument used by proponents of working time reduction is that the amount 
of production of products and services in an economy is a given, so a possible 
reduction in working time will lead to a redistribution of a certain amount of work to 
more workers, increasing employment.  In a perfectly competitive economy, any 
mandatory reduction in working hours would create flaws and limitations in a 
situation where the theoretical model allocates resources efficiently (Cahuc & 
Zylberberg, 2008). According to the theory, a reduction in working hours could not 
lead to an increase in employment. When the maximum working time is reduced 
legally, companies have three options: to rely on overtime, to hire staff for limited 
working hours or to reduce production levels. If we consider for the sake of analysis 
that in this model firms want to maintain stable production and that the only relevant 
labor cost is the hourly wage of workers then the problem of reducing working hours 
can be completely solved by recruiting new employees for the hours left. In this case, 
reducing the working week will lead to an increase in employment. Even under these 
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conditions, however, any reduction in unemployment will increase the demand for 
labor and thus lead to an increase in average wages. As a result, it will gradually 
reduce the employment level again (Plantenga & Dur, 1998). However, it would be 
methodologically incorrect to ignore all the other costs associated with hiring new 
employees (costs associated with their recruitment and training, labor contributions 
that are in many cases unrelated to working hours, etc.). The aforementioned costs 
differentiate labor costs by making a new employee's hourly labor cost higher than an 
existing employee. If we take into account that overtime is usually costed higher than 
the conventional working time we realize that in this case too, unit costs are rising and 
as a result, the increase in employment is rather doubtful. Consequently, if a company 
decides to use overtime, a reduction in the working week may not increase the 
marginal cost for each hour of overtime but increases the marginal cost of hiring a new 
employee. So businesses prefer to "buy" more hours of work from existing employees 
but not hire new ones. In this way, when the working time is reduced, the demand for 
overtime is increased but this is not transformed into an increase in employment and 
a reduction in unemployment. Accordingly, some companies may prefer to modify 
their production process (purchase of new capital equipment that will replace the 
labor force) or their output level as a consequence of reduced working hours for 
reasons of sustainability. In this case, as production costs increase (since a given labor 
cost is split into fewer hours of work) firms may choose to produce less, reducing not 
only the hours worked but also the number of employees. 
If we take into account that the increase in labor costs can cause workers to replace 
capital equipment, then we realize that not only is the reduction in working hours not 
a response to the decline in employment due to technological change but, on the 
contrary, may accelerate the pace with which companies decide to upgrade their 
production technology (Börsch-Supan, 2002). 
Correlation between working time and productivity 
In business, the unit cost of the product is important, not the absolute wage cost per 
se. By extension, there are other parameters too in the production function that 
determine the impact of reducing weekly working hours on employment at a given 
level of production. One of these parameters is the productivity of workers in relation 
to working hours, since, for example, when the working days are longer, more fatigue 
occurs and their marginal productivity decreases. Productivity is expressed as the 
number of product units produced at a given time using specific resources (in this 
case workers). In conclusion, the more productive an economy is, the more product is 
produced in less time. Productivity is therefore influenced not only by production 
technology but also by the quality of the workforce (how well employees are, what 
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level of education they have, how much they strive to get their job done, etc.) (De 
Spiegelaere & Piasna, 2017). 
The theoretical approach that underpins productivity growth as a result of reduced 
working hours attributes it to three factors: biological, organizational, and employee 
motivation factors. The first factor (biological) is related to the fact that fewer work 
hours reduce the level of fatigue of employees. At the same time, less fatigue improves 
concentration resulting in increased productivity. The second factor relates to the 
improvement of the production process resulting from the extended hours of use of 
capital equipment and the increased innovation and creativity that allows employees 
to carry out more work in less time. The increase in capital productivity, in this case, 
may be associated with an increase in the hours the production line operates. 
Assuming, for example, that the company previously operated two shifts of 8 hours 
each (16 in total) and after the reduction of working hours 3 shifts of 6 hours were 
created, we observe that the operating cost of capital equipment is reduced as 
operating and maintenance cost data are distributed to more hours of use and 
therefore more production volume. Through this expanded use of production 
equipment, there will be a reduction in unit production costs. This could reduce 
working hours while maintaining the level of pre-work time levels. However, this 
would be applicable to companies engaged in product production while it would be 
doubtful whether the same benefits would exist for service providers unless there was 
a corresponding increase in demand for services (Bosch & Lehndorff, 2001; Hoel & 
Vale, 1986). Finally, a third factor that is difficult to quantify, however, relates to 
employees' motivation to work more efficiently, even sacrificing their break time, for 
example in response to less work time. 
Prerequisites for increasing employment in an environment of reduced working hours 
As stated above, according to the theory that employment could potentially increase 
due to reduced working time. In any case, however, there is a link between working 
hours and employee earnings, which casts doubt on the acceptance of the measure of 
work week restriction by labor unions and employees (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2008). 
When the limitation of working time is combined with increases in hourly earnings so 
that the monthly wage is not reduced, then there is essentially a double unequal 
redistribution of available resources, and this indirect increase in pay will be even 
greater if typical annual pay increases are taken into account. 
In this case, the reduction of working hours creates a clear increase in production 
costs. In order to be viable to reduce the workweek and ultimately to increase  
employment, there must either be a reduction in remuneration equal to a reduction in 
working hours or an overall wage bargain where lower annual increases will be 
agreed to compensate for the working time reduction. If in this way, the impact of the 
increase in wage costs is minimized by productivity gains, then unit production costs 
will remain stable thereby improving the performance of the economy in 
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employment. In addition, another way that could the working time reduction has a 
positive effect on employment is to disconnect the time of using capital equipment 
from the basic business hours. In production plants that make extensive use of 
production machinery, most of the cost is related to the limited time of use of the 
machinery and not to the wage cost. If a possible reduction in working time is 
accompanied by negotiation and ultimately agreement, to limit working hours and 
steady earnings in return for extended line operation through shifts even in non-social 
hours (for example late at night) then it will be achieved a reduction of operating 
expenses. Increasing use of capital equipment can produce the same number of 
product units in a shorter period of time, reducing the hours that production 
machinery is not used (Bosch & Lehndorff, 2001). 
Theory of collective bargaining 
As mentioned in the previous section, the impact of reducing working hours largely 
depends on the 'reaction' of wage costs to this reduction in working time. Therefore, 
it is of particular interest to look at the balances that are formed when this restriction 
occurs in economies with extensive use of collective bargaining. According to Cahuc 
et al., (2008), the effect of reduced working time depends on the bargaining power of 
labor unions and employers, current legislation, workers' preferences for reduced 
working hours, and the degree of coordination encountered in the economy. Cahuc et 
al., (2008) in their theoretical model consider the case of an economy where working 
hours and earnings are determined after collective bargaining between employers and 
labor unions. In the economy in which these partners operate, there is a statutory 
upper limit on working time which is separate from normal working hours. The 
difference between the working time provided for in each employee's contract and the 
ceiling shall be remunerated as overtime with a higher hourly wage than usual. The 
main objective of the trade unions is to reach the best possible agreement for their 
members which provides as few hours as possible and higher wages. The result of 
collective bargaining with businesses is what will determine working hours, earnings, 
and ultimately the number of jobs. According to the predictions of this theoretical 
model, the stronger the trade unions and the better their bargaining position, the 
shorter the working hours agreed with employers. 
In addition, a firm's negotiating position on the issue of working hours is related to 
the firm's market position and the degree of centralization of collective bargaining. 
When the company is a market leader (thus facing less competition) and at the same 
time collective bargaining is highly centralized, it is more likely to reach an agreement 
that provides for fewer hours of work. Correspondingly, when labor unions 
emphasize maintaining a level of employment, they tend to agree to more working 
hours in order to divide wages into longer working time to keep wage costs lower. In 
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this case, even higher levels of employment could be achieved through wage 
moderation and the high degree of coordination observed. 
In particular, according to Cahuc et al. (2008), the elasticity of wage hours relative to 
working time (H) depends on the number of hours worked. If elasticity is a positive 
number, it is concluded that any reduction in working hours will result in a reduction 
in the employee's salary. In addition, the longer the working hours for an employee, 
the greater the reduction in his pay as a result of reduced working hours. 
Consequently, it would be easier to apply a reduction in working hours in cases where 
the working hours are sufficient (because the reduction in pay would not represent a 
disproportionately large share of pay) and workers attach great importance to more 
leisure time. 
 
FIGURE 1. EMPLOYMENT IN A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ENVIRONMENT 
Source: Adapted from Cahuc et al., (2008) 
Figure 1 illustrates the employment response to wage reductions in an environment 
of widespread collective bargaining and centralization. Hb is the number of working 
hours determined in the context of negotiations between employers and labor unions. 
For Hb working hours employment is at Lb level. After collective bargaining, the 
working hours at Hb level are agreed so that the individual working hours are equal 
to the parallel straight line to the right (Lb, Hb). As the graph shows, the maximum 
employment level for the economy is at Lmax. To achieve this level of employment 
the working hours must be Hmax. The reduction of working hours in the collective 
bargaining environment we are considering will only increase employment if 
employees are working longer hours than at Hmax because below that, the wage 
increases extensively as a result of reduced working hours (large elasticity) preventing 
the creation of more jobs. The Hmax point is what the trade unions want in a bargain 
and can be achieved when they use all their bargaining power. The distance between 
Hb and Hmax decreases as the market power of the company increases. Also may 
decrease when the preference for the leisure time of the employees is increased or 
when the bargaining power of the labor unions decreases. By extension, when all of 
the above factors are present at the same time, it would be likely that Hmax would be 
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very close to Hb and that employment could be slightly increased through a 
mandatory reduction in working hours. In this sense, as we shall see, the results 
should be similar to those of monopsony. 
Reducing working time also has an impact on employee productivity as it relates to 
the performance and effort maid. In the case of centralized collective bargaining 
systems where labor unions represent a large proportion of the workforce, it is 
particularly likely to agree to reduce working hours for their members. In return, it 
may be agreed to adopt a wider working time that would allow businesses to operate 
at a time that previously didn’t. Based on figure 1 we can see that the Hmax point 
could increase as the elasticity of the working hours increases. This elasticity is related 
to the possible extent of restructuring of the production structure. Consequently, it 
will be smaller in cases where businesses can reduce labor demand through the 
application of new production methods (Cahuc et al., 2008). In conclusion, the labor 
flexibility agreed by labor unions  in order to achieve fewer working hours may lead 
to worse working conditions despite the reduced working time. 
Theory of monopsony power 
In a market where businesses have monopsony power, it is observed that a small 
mandatory reduction in working hours will increase employment. Conversely, when 
the reduction in working hours is large, the impact on employment will be negative 
(Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2008; Marimon & Zilibotti, 2000). In a monopsony market that 
does not have an upper limit on working time, companies will choose the right 
combination of wages and working hours to maximize their profits. By extension, they 
will opt for a salary lower than the salary in the competitive market and working 
hours higher than those in the competitive market. Therefore, the level of employment 
in the economy is lower. If the state imposes a legal upper limit on working time, the 
monopsony market restrictions on working hours will be lifted and, consequently, the 
employment rate will increase as the benefits of workers from employment will 
increase. But while legislative intervention improves employment, alone is not 
enough to reach the optimum point. At the same time, the monopsony market should 
have a minimum wage in combination with a reduction in working time to improve 
social well-being. 
Trying to graphically illustrate this view (Figure 2), we observe that the working hours 
in a monopsony are HM. If these hours are more than the maximum working hours 
then they do not impose any restrictions on the monopoly firms that continue to 
employ LM labor for HM hours per day. If the working hours selected by the firms in 
the market are more than HM then the government restriction on working hours limits 
business policies and sets the employment level to LM. If in this monopsony the 
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working hours are set at a level H which is lower than the upper limit HM then 
employment is plotted along the horizontal straight line to the right of H. 
 
FIGURE 2. EMPLOYMENT IN A MONOPSONY 
Source: Adapted from Cahuc et al., (2008)  
Keeping the above in mind, we observe that there would be an increase in 
employment if the hours worked were more than the hours HC  that are the hours 
worked by an employee in a competitive market. In this case, employment would 
reach LC. Correspondingly, when working hours are reduced to below the HC level, 
the impact on employment is negative. In conclusion, employment reaches its highest 
level when the government exogenously sets an upper limit of employment equal to 
the HC point which constitutes the working time in a competitive economy. Even so, 
however, the level of employment is lower than that of the competitive economy due 
to lower remuneration in a monopsony (Cahuc et al., 2008). 
In conclusion, the monopsony market model (although it is utopian and not present 
in everyday life) ,as well as collective bargaining, shows that a slight reduction in 
working hours improves employment temporarily but in the long run does not 
substantially affect the stabilization of the economy at a higher level of employment. 
However, employees have different priorities regarding their professional lives. Some 
prefer more leisure time (fewer working hours) while others prefer the higher 
financial welfare that most working hours give them. Given that employees have 
different productivity and working time priorities, they are unlikely to improve 
overall long-term employment and well-being by simply setting a ceiling on working 
time without taking into account the particularities of each employee and each 
business (Cahuc & Zylberberg, 2008). In addition, as we observe, the view that the 
level of the product remains constant and therefore a reduction in the basic working 
hours will in itself lead to an increase in employment is misleading. Accordingly, the 
impact of the reduction in working hours is determined by the working time that 
companies choose to 'buy' on the basis of the resulting labor costs. When this time is 
reduced compared to the previous working week, then there is a decrease in 
employment. By extension one of the most important conditions for maintaining or 
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slightly increasing employment is wage restraint. As Cahuc and Zylberberg (2008) 
observe, a possible 10% reduction in working hours reduces profitability and output 
in each case examined unless accompanied by a corresponding 10% reduction in 
earnings. In cases where earnings have remained stable, a reduction in working time 
has called into question the viability of businesses. As can be seen from the above, 
when a reduction in working time is not accompanied by a corresponding reduction 
in earnings, it is rarely beneficial. Finally, we examined the case of bargaining over 
working time and wages through collective bargaining between labor unions and 
employers. To a large extent, the unions' attitude is related to their bargaining power 
and the economic environment in which they operate. In this case, too, it was observed 
that when it came to improving employment, labor unions tended to agree on wage 
restraint and reduced working hours in return for accepting work during 'non-social 
hours'. 
By extension, although the competitive market model seems more realistic in its 
theoretical predictions, it would be useful to move on to the next sections in empirical 
research based on a meta-analytic technic that examins the impact of reduced working 
hours on employment and productivity in order to form a clearer picture of whether 
reducing working hours is a way of tackling the potential decline in employment due 
to technological change. 
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE WORKING TIME REDUCTION 
IN THE NETHERLANDS AND FRANCE 
As mentioned above, monopsony is an extreme form of an imperfectly competitive 
economy created in cases where combined labor mobility and high costs of entry into 
new markets are combined. In the current form of the economy, it is particularly 
difficult to come up with monopsonistic markets, so this approach is primarily a 
theoretical prediction of the impact of reduced working hours on employment but is 
not particularly likely to be implemented in practice. As an extension, in this section, 
we will look at the other two theoretical approaches mentioned: competitive market 
theory and collective bargaining theory. Examining how the reduction of working 
time in the Netherlands and France has evolved, we will attempt to illustrate the 
impact of working hours on an economy in which the reduction of working time is 
governed by the theory of collective bargaining and one that is governed by the theory 
of competitive market respectively. 
Netherlands 
The reason we chose the Netherlands as a representative example of collective 
bargaining theory is the structure of the country's labor relations characterized by a 
high degree of coordination, high participation in labor unions and widespread use 
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of collective bargaining. An interesting element, as we shall see below, is the 
acceptance by the workers of salary reduction in the form of non-compensation for 
hours not worked due to the limitation of working hours. This is because of the 
interesting point, as mentioned in the previous section, is the relation between unit 
labor costs and employment. 
Structure of industrial relations in the Netherlands 
The reduction in working time has been the subject of economic analysis in the 
Netherlands for years. Proponents of this approach have argued that a reduction in 
working hours is a prerequisite for a significant reduction in the unemployment rate. 
Apparently, supporters of this view perceived labor demand as a given size. 
Consequently, a reduction in working hours would result in an increase in available 
jobs and as a result to a reduction in unemployment. In contrast, employers disagreed 
with the reduction of working time as they believed it would lead to increased hourly 
labor costs, lower production, lower employment levels and ultimately fewer jobs. In 
the late 1970s, the economy began to show signs of stagnation. Growth slowed and 
unemployment rose rapidly (from about 1-2% in the 1960s to 6% in the late 1970s (van 
Ours, 2006)). The protection of jobs was a priority for labor unions during this period. 
As a result, the reduction in working hours has been reintroduced to the public debate 
as a tool to maintain employment at previous levels. Employers, on their part, fearing 
that a further reduction in working hours would result in an increase in hourly labor 
costs, did not want any further reduction in working time. Alternatively, they offered 
workers early retirement plans (Plantenga & Dur, 1998). Gradually, as the economy 
has stagnated, part-time work is beginning to be seen as a way of restructuring the 
labor market. In the early 1980s, unemployment reached 12% (in 1984). In any case, 
labor unions saw employment protection as a clear priority. As a result, they were 
increasingly accepting flexible working relationships. In this context, employers and 
employees have agreed to reduce working time in return for wage restraint and the 
abolition of automatic wage adjustment (Wassenaar Agreement). At the same time, as 
a consequence of rising unemployment, flexible forms of employment were partially 
diminished as a result of state policies that improved the legal protection of part-time 
workers. 
In 1998, through numerous collective agreements in different sectors, the working 
week was again reduced to 36 hours. Through the adoption of more flexible forms of 
employment, unemployment declined to 2% in 2001. In the following years, although 
there was some increase in unemployment, it nevertheless stabilized at an acceptable 
level (close to 5-5.5%). Following the Wassenaar Agreement, part-time workers enjoy 
the same social benefits as full-time workers, while being paid in proportion to their 
actual working time. The Wassenaar Agreement was essentially the turning point for 
the labor market as it left behind a long period of ideological differences between 
social actors and established a period of cooperation and harmony. It is precisely this 
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coordination between the social partners and the consensus that has brought about 
such a dramatic improvement in the performance of the economy. The Dutch labor 
market is characterized by a high degree of cooperation between the social partners. 
In the context of the dialogue between employers and labor unions it was agreed that 
since the primary priority of workers was to protect employment, workers' demands 
should not increase labor costs or reduce the operating hours of the enterprise. It is 
therefore observed that in the case of the Netherlands wages did not remain stable on 
a monthly basis despite reduced working hours. The reduction in monthly earnings 
was equivalent to a decrease in working time. In conclusion, for its part, the state has 
committed and reformed the entire social security system. Now part-time workers are 
no different from full-time workers in the area of taxation and social security. 
Subsequently, in the context of this reform of the welfare state, replacement  rate of 
unemployment benefits in relation to the last wage and the duration of their payment 
have been reformed. 
Evaluation of the Dutch model of reduction of working time 
By looking at the Dutch example, we aim to examine whether reducing working hours 
is a way to deal with the possible contraction of employment due to technological 
change in a highly coordinated environment with high participation in labor unions 
and centralized collective bargaining. It is recalled that according to the predictions of 
the theory of collective bargaining when labor unions emphasize maintaining a level 
of employment tend to keep wage costs lower. Therefore, in some cases, 
unemployment could be reduced through wage moderation and the high degree of 
coordination observed. In the case of the Netherlands, all the above factors apply 
therefore we would expect a clear increase in productivity, a decrease in 
unemployment and an increase in employment. 
Undoubtedly, the unemployment statistics are particularly important indicators of 
labor market performance. However, in many cases, they do not describe the full 
picture. In the case of the Netherlands, much of the reduction in unemployment is due 
to the systematic shift of workers out of the labor market (for example, through early 
retirement or disability benefits). Therefore, statistics examining the employment and 
not unemployment are of particular importance. In the Dutch labor market, non-
employment rates are high despite falling sharply between 1985 and 2000. It is 
indicative that in 1985, 47.7% of productive citizens were out of the labor market due 
to unemployment, disability, education, early retirement or other personal reasons. 
This figure dropped significantly to 34.4% in 2000 but is still high (van Ours, 2006: 
137). If we look at the rates of non-participation in the labor market for males for the 
same period, we will see that they have remained stable. Consequently, this decrease 
is mainly due to increased participation in the labor market for women. For many 
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years, women's participation in the production process was limited in the 
Netherlands, compared to other European countries. By and large, their increase in 
labor market participation is due to the "catch up effect" and to a lesser extent to the 
increase in part-time employment. This is because when an economy starts at a lower 
level of employment for women compared to the rest of Europe and tries to approach 
the European average, the increase is actually higher than the rest of the countries but 
this is due to the lower level of employment for women initially. A second reason for 
low labor market participation is as mentioned above a large number of citizens 
receiving welfare support. According to the Dutch legal framework, one can receive a 
disability benefit after the expiry of the sickness benefit which is paid for one year. 
While sickness benefit is temporary and is intended to constitute an income safety net, 
the disability benefit is not temporary in nature and is intended for employees who 
are wholly or partially unable to receive a salary from their work (as a result of 
disability or other problems for whatever reason). The broad wording of the legal 
framework has led to the phenomenon of a large proportion of the working 
population receiving disability benefits. Specifically, in 1999, 17.9% of 55-65 year olds 
received a welfare allowance (van Ours, 2006). Under the law, for an employee to 
receive this benefit, there was no need for an objectively obvious medical reason. As 
a result, an increasing number of workers were receiving full or partial disability 
benefits for psychological reasons (Spithoven, 2002). 
The legal framework mentioned above has become the vehicle by which a large 
proportion of workers near retirement age leave the labor market (artificially reducing 
the unemployment rate). The number of these workers did not appear in the official 
unemployment data but at the same time, a large number of former workers applied 
for and received disability benefits (CPB, 1998). Already in the late 1970s, the number 
of beneficiaries increased rapidly, with unemployment rising at a slower rate than the 
number of beneficiaries (Spithoven, 2002). In conclusion, in large part because of the 
legal protection of workers in the event of redundant dismissals, employers and 
employees preferred the choice of layoff benefits in order to reduce their staff, largely 
hiding much of the unemployment rate (Hassink, 1996 ch. 6). Table 1 shows the 
percentage of the workforce receiving full-time equivalent benefits for 1980-1999. 
TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE OF THE WORKFORCE RECEIVING BENEFITS FROM 1980-1999 
 
Source: Adapted from Marx (2007) 
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The percentage shown in the table is calculated as the ratio of the recipients of full-
time equivalents to the total workforce. Consequently, although there is a downward 
trend, this could be attributed to an increase in the number of the working population 
in absolute terms and not to a real reduction in benefits recipients. Despite the strong 
job creation that could significantly reduce dependency on the welfare state, the 
number of people who are stopped being financially dependent on welfare benefits is 
very limited. In this sense, the Dutch model failed to bring these beneficiaries back 
into the labor market. Lastly, although the Dutch labor market has seen a large 
increase in the number of people employed, nevertheless taking into account the 
working hours per year, then this increase is not as impressive as it initially seemed. 
If we calculate this increase in full-time equivalents we will see that employment 
growth is 15.9% lower than when absolute jobs are calculated (Spithoven, 2002). 
Although the government expected to reduce unemployment by adopting more 
flexible forms of work, it remained relatively stable during 1987-1996 as most new 
part-time jobs were occupied not by registered unemployed but by new entrants 
(mainly students and former housewives) entered the labor market. 
Conclusions regarding the “Dutch Miracle” 
The Dutch example was used to answer the research question of whether reducing 
working hours is a way of dealing with the possible contraction of employment due 
to technological change in a highly centralized and coordinated environment. As it 
turned out, the Netherlands was an excellent case for analysis because it meets the 
following conditions: particularly high centralization of the labor market with a high 
degree of coordination, the achievement of wage restraint through proportional wage 
reductions (due to reduced hours) and extensive reductions in working time. Even in 
an ideal model such as the one that closely resembles the model of collective 
bargaining, we see that the results are not what we would expect. 
As has been said earlier, a reduction in working hours is not a panacea, and it is 
doubtful whether it could solve the contraction in employment as a result of 
technological change as it does not lead to increased productivity. In the area of 
employment and unemployment, we see that this reform has not "magically" reduced 
unemployment. What has happened is the decline in the natural rate of 
unemployment due to changes in the labor market. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
real unemployment fell below its normal rate, leading gradually to wage increases 
and as a self-fulfilling prophecy to rising unemployment again. With the structure of 
the labor market, this vicious cycle will be repeated over time based on the phase of 
the business cycle in which the economy is located. If we combine the above with the 
high degree of dependency on the welfare state and the low employment rates at older 
ages associated with a large number of early retirement financed by the welfare state 
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we will realize that the reduction in time In the case of the Netherlands, it is clearly 
not a response to the decline in employment. In conclusion, the "Dutch miracle" 
consists of lower than expected unemployment reductions as reflected by full-time 
equivalents, high "hidden" unemployment, and low productivity growth. 
France 
By looking at the French example, we aim to examine whether reducing working 
hours is a way to deal with the possible contraction of employment due to 
technological change in a competitive market environment. France is a country that is 
not particularly influenced by trade unions, nor is it highly coordinated. Participation 
in labor unions decreased from 22% in 1970 to 9% in 1992 (Hunt, 1998). To a large 
extent, these idiosyncratic differences are also reflected in the structure of labor 
relations, since negotiations on reducing working time are usually initiated by the 
workers rather than the state (Boulin, 1993). An interesting element, as we shall see 
below, is the different reaction of the labor market after the 1982 reforms and the 
Aubry reforms, demonstrating that the reduction of working time without subsidies 
by the State has a negative impact on employment. 
Structure of industrial relations in France 
The issue of reducing working time has been debated for years. Working hours first 
began to decline significantly in the 1970s. The sharp decline in working time took 
place between 1974 (from 48 hours) and 1981 (to 40 hours) (Cahuc et al., 2008). The 
Mitterrand government in May 1982 completely unexpectedly reduced working 
hours again to 39 although there was no particular support for the measure by 
employers. At the same time, it amended overtime legislation. Under the new scheme, 
the first 4 hours of overtime were paid 25% more than the standard hourly wage. 
Employment beyond the first 4 hours was paid 50% higher hourly wages. 
Furthermore, the government has proposed to employers to keep monthly salaries at 
pre-cut levels, without explicitly legislating. Indeed, over 90% of employees did not 
have any change in the level of remuneration (Cahuc et al., 2008). Later, in 1996 
through the Robien Act, voluntary reductions in working time were introduced by 10-
15% and employment increased by 10% in exchange for a reduction of insurance 
contributions by 7 years. However, unemployment has not declined to a sufficient 
degree. Thus, in 1998 the Socialist Co-operative Government of  Lionel Jospin (1997-
2002) launched an ambitious plan to reduce the working time from 39 to 35 hours in 
order to reduce unemployment. The reduction of working hours this time was 
compulsory and took into account the economic impact of reduced working time on 
businesses in contrast to the 1982 legislation. This reduction was made through two 
legislative initiatives named after Labor Minister Martine Aubry. 
Originally adopted in June 1998, the Aubry I Act gave financial incentives (grants) to 
businesses to reduce the working time of their staff in order to increase the number of 
people employed. A company had to reduce its working time by at least 10% and 
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increase its number of employees by at least 6% to be eligible for a grant. For each 
employee whose working hours were reduced or for each new hire, the number of 
employer contributions was subsidized for five years. The legislation has 
distinguished between large (more than 20 employees) and smaller businesses, 
recognizing that smaller ones need more time to adjust to new data. The reduction in 
working time could take place by 2002 for businesses with fewer than 20 employees. 
To facilitate this transition, for smaller firms the law reduced the cost of overtime 
remuneration and increased the overtime ceiling to continue to employ their staff for 
39 hours, paying the extra overtime cost. Compared to the "Robien Law" the grants 
were not based solely on the increase in recruitment but also on the reduction of 
working time. Because most small businesses did not have statutory labor unions, the 
legislation was intended to influence the way trade unionism works. In order to 
benefit from the favorable provisions of the law, businesses employing less than 50 
employees would have to sign firm level agreements that the reduced working hours 
were apparent (Chemin & Wasmer, 2009). 
Two years later, in January 2000, the second Aubry Act (called Aubry II) was enacted. 
This law again expanded the range of grants to businesses in two ways: on the one 
hand, it subsidized FRF 4,000 per year and per employee reduced the working hours 
to 35 per week. On the other hand, it subsidized part of the payroll costs of those with 
low or average remuneration. The amount of grant amounted to FRF 17,500 per 
employee who was paid the minimum wage (Cahuc et al., 2008). These financial 
incentives concerned companies that were not otherwise subsidized at that time. The 
main difference from Aubry I is that there was no minimum number of new jobs that 
needed to be created for businesses to be eligible for state support. Even after the end 
of the period in which the employer contributions were subsidized, the payroll cost 
subsidy continued to exist for those firms that agreed to 35 working hours provided 
they expressed a desire to create or save jobs (Hayden, 2006). Alongside these 
measures, a minimum guaranteed wage has been instituted which has been increasing 
annually on the basis of inflation so as not to reduce the monthly allowance of 
workers. Subsequently, in January 2003 the Fillon Act reduced the incentives to 
businesses that had not completed the transition to 35 business hours per week but 
were not fully abolished. The legislation was relaxed even more in 2005 as it became 
easier and more cost-effective for businesses to pay their employees for overtime, and 
employees are entitled to work longer than 220 hours a year provided they do not 
exceed 44 hours per week on average. Grants were no longer linked to a reduction in 
working time. The result was a loss to businesses that reduced their employees' 
working time to 35 hours a week while their competitors stayed 39 hours and received 
a partial subsidy for employer contributions from the state. 
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Evaluation of the French model of reduction of working time 
By looking at the French example, we aim to examine whether reducing working 
hours is a way to counter the potential contraction of employment due to 
technological change in a competitive market. It is recalled that, according to the 
predictions of competitive market theory, when labor time is reduced externally, as in 
the case of a legislated reduction in working time, production costs increase and thus 
employment is reduced. In the case of France, this happened in the first generation of 
reforms in 1982. Following the change in legislation, subsidies and tax incentives were 
provided for businesses to reduce the cost-neutral time, substantially confirming the 
predictions of competitive market theory. The French case is of particular interest 
because, over the last decades, the aim of reducing working time has been seeking to 
increase employment in different ways, each of which has produced different results.       
Essentially in the same economy, with just a few years of deviation from the same 
demand, the reduction in working time has had diametrically different effects on 
employment. The key difference is the rising cost factor as predicted by the 
competitive market model. As the working hours decrease, the marginal cost of 
production increases, resulting in a reduction in the optimum amount of product 
produced. This ,in turn, reduces the demand for labor. An extension, as will be shown 
by the policy of reducing working hours per se, is not a way of dealing with the 
possible contraction of employment, especially when this contraction is partly or 
entirely due to technological change. Higher marginal production costs will cause 
workers to be replaced by newer capital equipment. Consequently, in a competitive 
market experiencing the effects of technological change, a reduction in working hours 
could lead to a reduction in employment even if hourly earnings remain constant.  
In order to understand the consequences of the reduction in working time, we will 
first look at the reduction of working hours in 1982. As mentioned above, this 
reduction was sudden and unexpected but it took some years for it to be implemented. 
On the eve of the French elections in 1981, Francois Mitterrand's victory was unlikely, 
as most polls showed Giscard d'Estaing being re-elected. Similarly, the parliamentary 
elections took place after the presidential elections, therefore, although the reduction 
of working time was a question on the socialists' pre-election agenda, however, given 
the demographic picture, the implementation of the reduction was unexpected. The 
cut of working time occurred in February 1982 but the measure was implemented very 
slowly. According to official statistics, in April 1982 when the standard labor force 
survey was carried out, only a few companies had managed to harmonize the working 
week of their employees. 
From 28% in 1982 the proportion of workers working 39 or 40 hours a week dropped 
to 20% in 1983-1985 (Crépon & Kramarz, 2002). In order to study the impact of the 
sharp decline in working hours, Crepon and Kramarz (2002) analyzed labor force 
surveys for the years 1977-1987 by comparing workers who worked 40 or more hours 
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a week with those who worked less than 39. Their findings showed that workers who 
worked for 40 hours or more a week in March 1981 were less likely to remain in place 
after the reform compared to the same characteristics (educational, racial,  etc.) 
workers employed for 36-39 hours weekly. In addition, they concluded that those who 
continued to work 40 hours in 1982 were more likely to lose their job than those who 
worked less than 39 hours. All of their findings were statistically significant and 
showed a negative correlation between the reduction in working time and 
employment. 
Combined with legislative interventions that not only did not allow for a reduction in 
the proportion of working hours but increased the minimum wage by 5% since July 
1981, the abovementioned adverse effects mainly affected those remunerate around 
the minimum wage level. These findings are confirmed by the model of Abowd et al., 
(1996), which estimates that this increase in the minimum wage will result in an 
increased rate of destruction in low-wage jobs (about 8%), which corresponds to about 
2% of the rate of job loss in the economy annually. The result is that labor cost elasticity 
is less than -1, indicating inelastic demand for labor, a consequence of increased wage 
costs and reduced working time (Crépon & Kramarz, 2002). In conclusion, by looking 
at the unemployment figures for the period, we see an increase after the reduction of 
working time. In 1982 unemployment was at 6.6% while in subsequent years it rose to 
7.3% in 1983, 8.4% in 1984 and 8.7% in 1985. In the next major reduction in working 
time (at 35 hours under the Robien and Aubry I laws), although wage levels and other 
non-wage costs remained steady, corporate grants began to apply. This State aid was 
intended to absorb the negative effects of employment on the reduction of working 
time again. Looking at unemployment rates in 1997, before the implementation of 
Aubry I, we can see that unemployment declined sharply from 10.7% in 1997 to 7.8% 
in 2001 following the implementation of grants. Similarly, unemployment rose again 
to 8.5% when tax incentives began to be re-examined in 2003. This increase in 
unemployment is largely linked to the subsidies given to businesses. 
So while the subsidized reduction in working time has actually created jobs, it does 
not reflect the full picture. During the period 1999-2001, unemployment in France 
decreased by 2.2% after a decade of persistently high unemployment. Unemployment 
on the European Union average dropped by 1.2%. Unemployment rate reduction in 
France is higher but taking into account that the average GDP growth in France at that 
time was 3.1% while in the European Union 2.5% it is concluded that unemployment 
is largely related to the more favorable economic environment in France at that time. 
According to the research of Boeri et al., (2008) between 1997 and 2000, firms that had 
reduced Aubry I's employment time experienced a 10.5% increase in employment. Of 
this percentage, the increase attributable to improved demand in the economy (not 
linked to a reduction in working time) was 5%, while a 2% is attributed to the decrease 
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in labor costs that were linked to the existence of the subsidies. The reduction in 
working hours contributed to a 3.4% increase in employment. At this rate, of course, 
the contribution of grants to businesses should be taken into account as through tax 
exemptions ensure the viability of the business. Without them, they might have 
reduced their employment or even ceased their operation. 
In order to calculate the increase in employment that is linked to the Robien and 
Aubry laws, the number of jobs created following the implementation of these laws 
was examined. From this figure, the number of jobs that would have been created 
without the incentives provided by the state was subtracted. This number was 
calculated on the basis of the jobs created in similar typical businesses that remained 
despite the motivation given by the state at 39 hours a week. The result showed that 
the Robien law increased employment by 7.2% while the Aubry law increased by 7% 
(Jugnot, 2002 as mentioned in Boisard, 2004). If we take into account however, the 
financial cost of corporate grants then the way we evaluate the effects of the reduction 
in working time may also change. In general, the way in which the reduction of 
working time in France was implemented following the Aubry legislation is cost-
neutral for businesses and that was the reason why employment was not negatively 
affected as it was in 1982. However, it very high the cost of money or tax exchanges 
given to businesses by the state. 
It was estimated that the cost of implementing the program in 2003-4 reached 6 billion 
euros, creating or saving 350,000 jobs (Estevao & Sa, 2006). However, this amount does 
not include the costs resulting from the reduction of working time and the 
corresponding grants for employees in the public sector. According to the most 
pessimistic calculations, if the public sector is also calculated, the cost can reach 16-22 
billion euros. If this number divided by 350,000 jobs that it is estimated that were 
created or saved by the measure, then the cost-per-job reaches the 45,700-62,800 euros 
(Askenazy, 2008; Heyer, 2013). Of this amount, we should deduct government 
revenue from additional personal income taxes due to higher incomes, increased 
value-added tax due to an increase in consumption (about EUR 3.7 billion) and 
reduced costs for unemployment benefits (1, EUR 8 billion) (Heyer, 2013). Therefore, 
the cost of the subsidy measure is estimated at 10.5-16.5 billion euros, ie 30,000-47,000 
euros per year per job. Of course we cannot calculate the exact amount of grants 
because it is correlated with the number of jobs, but in any case, it is a respectable size 
that, if enlarged, can cause financial problems larger than it was intended to solve. 
Conclusions regarding french working time reduction 
As mentioned above, the example of France was used to examine whether reducing 
working hours is a way of dealing with the possible contraction of employment in a 
competitive market environment. In the preceding sections, we have shown that the 
first wave of reduction in working time in 1982 confirms the predictions of the 
competitive market model. After applying the reduction in working time, there was 
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no positive correlation between unemployment and employment. On the contrary, 
the unemployment rate and the rate of job destruction have increased in response to 
the reduction in working hours, especially for wage earners near the bottom. The 
second wave of reductions in working time came when the working week was 
reduced to 35 hours from 39. This legislative effort was different from the previous 
one as it gave large tax and financial incentives to businesses to implement the 
reduction in working time. The purpose of government grants was to make the reform 
cost-neutral for businesses. Indeed, this reform increased the number of jobs as it did 
not affect the unit cost of the product for employers. However, this perspective is 
incomplete because it does not address the cost of government grants. If we take into 
account the cost of this measure, which is estimated that may reach EUR 47,000 per 
year per job, we realize that reducing working time is by no means a sustainable way 
of tackling rising unemployment. 
MATERIAL AND METHODS 
Working time and employment meta-analysis 
TABLE 2. LISTS OF SURVEYS 
 
This section will examine the existing empirical studies on the impact of reducing 
working time in order to draw more general conclusions about whether reducing 
working hours is a way to deal with the possible contraction of employment (Table 2). 
In order to achieve this objective, 9 empirical studies were examined, of which 18 
observations / elasticities of the working time were extracted. Of these 18 observations, 
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9 (50%) were statistically insignificant, 6 (33.33%) indicated that a decrease in working 
time caused a decrease in employment, and 3 (16.67%) indicated that a decrease in 
working time increased employment. However, several of the observations (5 in 
number - 27.78%), although statistically significant, had very little difference from 
zero. 
Some of the studies listed in Table 2 do not weigh their findings with regard to the 
increase in remuneration as a direct or indirect consequence of the reduction in 
working time, so in the subsequent analysis, they will not be taken into account to 
show the impact of the reduction of working time ceteris paribus.  
The first research to be examined is by Hunt (1999). This research examines the case 
of Germany where the reduction in working time was achieved through an agreement 
to maintain a fixed amount of monthly earnings received before the reduction, 
increasing the hourly labor costs. Looking at a sample of 30 industry sectors over the 
period 1984-1994, one concludes that a one hour reduction in working time (from 40 
to 39 hours - 2.5%) if the employment reduction resulting from increased wage costs 
is not weighed, reduces employment by 2.4%. When the findings are weighted to 
account for the increase in hourly labor costs, it concludes that a 2.5% reduction in 
working time reduces employment by 0.5% (when examining a sample of 10 
industries) and 3.8% (which however has a large standard error and is not statistically 
significant) when examining 30 industries. 
The second empirical study (Andrews et al., 2005) has not been included in the second 
meta-analysis because as it does not take into account the impact of reduced working 
time on shaping hourly labor costs. It deals with companies engaged in the processing, 
agriculture and service sectors of West and East Germany from 1993-1999. The 
findings show a large difference in the flexibility of employment in reducing the 
working time between East and West Germany largely due to different economic 
structures. In East Germany, a 4 hour (10.26%) reduction in working time greatly 
increased employment (up to 7.74%), while in the case of West Germany employment 
remained virtually unaffected (decreased by 0,82%). 
The third survey (Crépon & Kramarz, 2002) was conducted in France after the 
reduction of working time and the increase in the minimum wage in 1982. This study 
examined the impact of reducing working time through the possibility of an employee 
losing his or her job. The authors estimate that a 2.5% reduction in working time 
causes a 2-4% reduction in employment when the increase in wage costs is not taken 
into account. In order to take into account the increase resulting from both a 5% 
increase in the minimum wage and a statutory provision banning a reduction in the 
monthly wage proportional to work, they examined the likelihood of unemployment 
for the period 1982-1984 for which there were statistics on wage costs. According to 
these calculations, a 2.5% reduction in working time resulted in a 0.64% decrease in 
employment for workers who did not receive a pay rise. Those paid with the 
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minimum wage took a 5% pay rise. As a result, employment  was reduced by 8,34%. 
The decline in employment first hit workers with the minimum wage, and after 2 
years the rest of the workforce was affected by the reduction in working time. 
Subsequently, the Skuteruds' (2007) survey in Canada between 1997 and 2000 
examined the reduction of working time in Quebec from 44 to 40 hours per week. The 
peculiarity of this research is that, unlike those who calculated the change in working 
time in Europe, in the case of Quebec there was no restriction on maintaining the level 
of the monthly wage, while the measure concerned workers who were not members 
of labor unions, they were relatively unskilled and had high rates of unemployment. 
Consequently, all of the above features plus the fact that employers did not 
compensate employees for the reduced hours, making this case ideal for studying the 
reduction of working time as a job creation strategy. This study showed that a 9.09% 
reduction in working time failed to substantially increase employment. Specifically, 
when calculating the average of all sectors of the economy, the decline in working 
time by 9.09% causes a 0.5% decrease in employment for men and a 2% increase for 
women. 
Finally, the last research showing statistically significant observations is that of 
Estevao and Sa (2008). Its methodology is similar to that of Crepon and Kramarz. It 
essentially compares businesses over 20 people with smaller businesses that were not 
immediately forced to apply the cuts and calculates the likelihood of an employee 
becoming unemployed in each case. This study does not weigh employment outcomes 
based on the increase in hourly costs. However, it appears a tendency of an increase 
in the number of employees who work in two different companies by 0.7% after the 
law was implemented, while the employment decline ranged between 1 and 3.9% 
(decreasing as the years passed from 1999 to 2002). In conclusion, the authors observed 
that although the essence of the law was to increase employment, no such increase 
was observed in large enterprises over smaller ones.  
In order to give a more precise picture of the issue, we will proceed with an analysis 
of the aforementioned empirical studies. First, we will perform the meta-analysis by 
excluding only the elasticities that are not statistically significant (Table 3a). We will 
then exclude, except for statistically insignificant elasticities and those which have 
been derived from calculations that do not weigh the results of empirical studies on 
the basis of the increase in hourly costs (Table 4). In this way, we will have a clearer 
picture of the impact of working time reduction. 
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TABLE 3A. TABLE WITH STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANT ELASTICITIES  
 
r =
NxR
N
         r =
27668.5211
49871
     r = 0.5548 
In this way,  by using the data in Table 3a we calculate the weighted effect size. In 
order to calculate confidence intervals, we created a new table (Table 3b). 
TABLE 3B. TABLE USED TO CALCULATE THE VARIANCE OF EFFECT SIZE AND THE 
SAMPLING ERROR 
 
Based on the second and fifth columns, the variance of effect size and the sampling 
error will be calculated to correct the effect size variation based on these 
measurements. 
σr
2 =
17731.9679
49871
    σr
2 = 0.3555 
The sampling error can also be calculated directly from the data in the table. The only 
size not readily available is the average sample size. To calculate this, we will divide 
the total calculated in the second column by the number of studies we are considering. 
   σe
2 =   
0.47913
5540.2222
      σe 
2  = 0,0000864821 
Having calculated these two sizes, we can now calculate the variation of the effect size 
of our sample. 
σρ
2 =  σr
2 −  σe
2    σρ
2 = 0.3555 − 0.0000864821    σρ
2  = 0.3554 
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With this number, we calculate the confidence interval (95%). 
CIupper   =   r + 1,96√σρ2   =  1.7233   CIlower  =  r − 1,96√σρ2 =  -0.6137 
Average elasticity: 0.5548 
Based on the above, we can conclude that a preliminary 1% reduction in working time 
will result in a 0.5548% reduction in employment. However, the impact of reducing 
working time on the cost of working time has not been taken into account in this 
measurement. Even if monthly salaries remain unchanged as an absolute number, 
reducing working time increases the hourly labor costs. If we follow the 
aforementioned logic by calculating only those elasticities that are weighted to 
account for the increase in hourly costs, we will have a fuller picture of how the 
reduction in working time affects employment when employees are commensurate 
with their working time. The empirical studies that have made such a weighting are 
significantly less as shown in Table 4a. 
TABLE 4A. EMPIRICAL STUDIES WEIGHTED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE INCREASE IN HOURLY 
COSTS 
 
r =
NxR
N
         r =
5684.22
22863
     r = 0.2486 
TABLE 4B. TABLE USED TO CALCULATE THE VARIANCE OF EFFECT SIZE AND THE 
SAMPLING ERROR 
 
σr
2 =
62,381
22863
   σr
2 = 0,0027 
   σe
2 =   
0.88021
5714.75
    σe 
2  = 0.0001540 
σρ
2 =  σr
2 −  σe
2    σρ
2 = 0.0027 − 0.0001540   σρ
2  = 0.002546 
CIupper   =   r + 1,96√σρ2   =  0.3475    CIlower  =  r − 1,96√σρ2 =  0,1497 
Average elasticity: 0.2486 
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Discussion   
Based on the above findings we conclude that when the increase in hourly labor costs 
is weighted, employment is expected to decrease by 0.25% for every 1% decrease in 
working time. Compared to measures that do not weigh labor costs growth (elasticity 
0.55) we find that the impact on employment in both cases remains negative, but the 
employment decline is dramatically higher when workers' salaries are not 
proportionally reduced. Given the number of empirical surveys that are statistically 
insignificant or show resilience very close to zero, it is not easy to form a clear picture 
of the relationship between employment and working time. Although the elasticity 
we calculated through the meta-analysis shows that in any case, the reduction of 
working time does not increase employment, we should consider how the reduction 
of working time is decided. Empirically observing the method of application, we find 
that in most cases the labor unions press on and eventually achieve steady wage 
earnings despite the reduction in working time. Consequently, a large increase in 
hourly labor costs is an intrinsic part of reducing the working week. With this in mind, 
it may be that the real impact of the reduction in working time is closer to the elasticity 
calculated in the first case where the increase in hourly labor costs was not weighted. 
However, we also proceeded with the second meta-analysis to consider the more 
favorable scenario, namely a reduction in working time with a corresponding 
reduction in earnings. Even under these conditions, it seems that reducing working 
time does not improve employment and it is doubtful the reduction of working time 
to evolve in a way of dealing with the possible contraction of employment. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this article was to explore whether reducing working time could be a 
solution to the problem of rising and persistent unemployment that plagues many 
economies. In order to achieve this objective, models of the competitive market, of 
collective bargaining and of monopsony market were examined. The competitive 
market model predicts a decline in employment when working time is reduced as a 
result of the increase in hourly production costs. The collective bargaining model 
predicts that the impact on employment is determined, inter alia, by the strength of 
the bargaining partners and the economic environment. It is likely in that case that 
employment growth could be due to increased productivity and extended use of 
capital equipment. Finally, in a monopsony market a slight reduction in working 
hours would temporarily improve employment. However, in the long run, there 
would be no significant impact on stabilizing the economy at higher employment 
levels. Subsequently, the case studies of the Netherlands and France were examined, 
where these two countries are effectively used as a means of evaluating in practice the 
models of the competitive market and collective bargaining. In both cases, 
employment outcomes were not as expected as they did not demonstrate a radical and 
long-term solution to the problem of unemployment. 
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In conclusion, in the last section, we examined empirical research on the impact of 
reducing working time on employment. Our analysis presumes that reducing 
working time reduces employment. Specifically, a 1% reduction in working time 
causes a 0.25% - 0.55% reduction in employment. Based on the abovementioned we 
conclude that reducing working time is not a way to reduce unemployment and 
increase employment by substantially confirming the theoretical predictions of the 
competitive market model. The reduction of working time ultimately leads to an 
increase in hourly costs which affects both the unit cost of the product and the 
competitiveness of  business and economy in general, without providing employment 
benefits. 
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